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We study the evolution of the control structure for a large sample of privatized firms in OECD 
countries and find evidence broadly consistent with the concept of “reluctant privatization”, defined 
as the transfer of ownership rights in State-owned enterprises without a corresponding transfer of 
control rights. Indeed, as of 2000, governments are the largest shareholder or use special control 
powers to retain voting control of 62.4% of privatized firms. However, contrary to accepted theory, 
greater government control over privatized firms does not negatively affect market valuation. In fact, 
government stakes are positively and significantly related to peer-adjusted market-to-book ratios. 
Results are not driven by the choice of the benchmark, reverse causality or by agency costs associated 
with private ownership. Rather, it appears that the relationship documented reflects more frequent 
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I.  Introduction 
The wave of privatizations that began in the 1980s in the United Kingdom, and spread across 
the globe during the 1990s, is arguably the greatest transfer of ownership in the history of the 
corporation. Governments all over the world have either sold or are selling large blocks of their 
ownership positions in corporations to the private sector. In terms of flows, privatization transactions, 
including share issue privatization (SIP) and private placements, have raised globally revenues of 
US$1,230 billion during the 1977-2003 period, about one fifth of total issuance on public equity 
markets. Yet, stories in the popular press suggest that the roll back of the State has been incomplete. 
Governments have often separated ownership and control in privatized companies by means of 
pyramids, statutory restrictions and special-class shares that grant them exceptional powers.
1  
Italian privatizations provide a revealing example of this reluctance to relinquish control in 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs). After the 1992 general elections, when the country was facing one of 
the most acute economic and political crises of the post-war period, the government decided to launch 
its first large-scale privatization process. Major privatization deals implemented since 1993 have 
raised more than $100 billion, making Italy third in total value of privatizations worldwide (Securities 
Data Corporation). Despite these remarkable quantitative results, the Italian government is still an 
influential shareholder in many privatized firms.  For example, it holds direct and indirect stakes 
(through Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, CDP) in Eni (the largest oil and gas company), Enel (the electricity 
giant), Alitalia (the flagship carrier), and Finmeccanica (the aerospace, defense and IT group). It also 
enjoys special powers to veto strategic decisions and acquisitions in fully privatized companies such 
as Telecom Italia, the former telecommunication State monopoly. These preliminary observations 
feed the suspicion that, despite large-scale privatizations, governments still wield power in SOEs.  
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we want to document whether such a reluctance to 
relinquish control exists, and how widespread it is. Second, if we do find reluctance, we are interested 
in estimating its effect on firm value. Ultimately, this study concludes that reluctant privatization is 
                                                 
1 For example, Julian Ellison and Duncan Reed, Getting tough on golden shares, Financial Times, June 6, 2003.   2
not an Italian peculiarity but a common feature of divestiture in developed economies. However, we 
reach some unexpected conclusions concerning the market impact of this reluctance. 
We define reluctant privatization as the privatization of a SOE characterized by the sale of 
equity without a corresponding transfer of control rights.  This may happen because the government 
remains the largest ultimate shareholder of the company, although it no longer owns 100% of the 
stocks, or because it enjoys veto or special powers through its possession of so-called “golden 
shares.”
2 We document the evolution of corporate control in privatizations by carrying out a 
comprehensive analysis of the structure of ultimate control (voting) rights in a sample of 141 
privatized (publicly traded) companies from developed economies, over the period 1996 to 2000. We 
find that the most common privatization outcome is that the State remains the largest ultimate owner.  
This is true for about one third of so-called “privatized” firms.  
To our knowledge, with the exception of Tian’s (2000) study of Chinese privatizations, all 
other papers on privatization have at most focused on direct ownership.
3 In a recent paper, Boubakri, 
Cosset and Guedhami (2005) study direct ownership and conclude that governments relinquish 
control over time. We show that the picture looks totally different when indirect voting rights are 
accounted for. Our methodology in fact allows us to document that in more than 50% of privatized 
firms in which a government is the largest ultimate shareholder, this government employs pyramids 
and dual-class share structures to retain majority control. Had we not considered these mechanisms, 
we would have substantially understated the power of the State in privatized firms.
4 
5 
                                                 
2 We define golden shares as the complex of special powers and statutory constraints that enhance State control 
in privatized companies (see Section III.B).  
3 A few studies employing the notion of ultimate control outside a privatization setting have documented the 
widespread presence of governments as ultimate owners of banks (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 
2002), as well as more in general (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999, Claessens et al., 2000, and Faccio and Lang, 2002).  
4 Later in the paper we show that, as of 2000, governments directly controlled an average of 37.14% of voting 
rights, while their ultimate control stake was on average 52.18%. 
5 As further proof of the influence of governments over privatized firms, we find a number of cases in which 
government ministers or members of parliaments sat themselves on the board of our sample firms. For example, 
Belgian Justice Minister Tony Van Parys served as Chairman of Dexia Belgium SA during our sample period, 
while Senator Philippe Bodson served as Executive Director of Distrigaz SA; Canadian MP Hon. W. David 
Angus was director of Air Canada; Swedish MP Lennart Nilsson served as Chairman of Celsius AB; in the UK, 
where the relinquishment of voting rights appears to have been more complete, we identified several cases in 
which prominent members of the House of Lords sat on the boards of privatized firms including AEA 
Technology PLC, BG PLC, BP Amoco PLC, British Airways PLC, Rolls-Royce PLC, and Scottish and 
Southern Energy PLC. Several of these firms have outstanding “golden shares”.   3
Consistent with earlier findings by Jones, Megginson, Netter and Nash (1999), we document a 
widespread use of control restrictions and golden shares. However, we additionally show that these 
mechanisms are particularly common amongst privatized companies in which the government is not 
the largest shareholder. This combination of evidence allows us to conclude that through ownership or 
golden shares, governments are able to maintain control of almost two thirds of privatized firms. This 
result is quite surprising, given that conventional wisdom relates the period under study to a drastic 
rethinking of the role of State ownership which spurred a massive privatization wave: In fact, our 
evidence indicates that, even in a period during which governments were divesting substantial 
amounts through the sale of ownership of corporations, they maintained tight control in the majority 
of these firms. 
Reluctant privatization is not only important from a practical standpoint, it is also of theoretical 
interest due to the insights it may offer in the debate over the relative performance of private versus 
government controlled firms. Proponents of the “political view” argue that a principal-agent problem 
plagues government controlled firms; the owners (the taxpayers) have very different incentives from 
the manager (the bureaucrat or politician controlling the firm). In a government controlled firm, the 
manager may run the company to achieve political objectives (such as high employment) and thus 
may not try to maximize value. If privatization transfers ownership and control rights to outside 
investors whose main concern is the maximization of the value of their holdings, greater emphasis 
will be placed on efficiency (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Therefore the “political interference” 
hypothesis implies a negative relation between government control rights and the market valuation of 
a company. In other words, government reluctance to privatize should be negatively discounted in 
market values. 
We test the political interference hypothesis by comparing the market-to-book ratio of 
privatized companies with that of a control group of private companies. Given that the treatment 
group (the privatized companies) and the control group both comprise publicly listed companies, we 
can assume that we are controlling for the beneficial effect of stock listing on managerial incentives, 
and that the difference in valuation between the two groups reflects mainly the effect of government   4
control rights on firm value.
6 We find that the market value of privatized companies increases over 
time and tends to converge to the market-to-book ratios of their matching firms.
7 However, this 
convergence is not the consequence of government relinquishment of control rights. Interestingly, our 
panel reveals that a larger percentage of voting rights held by the State does not negatively affect firm 
value. Similarly, we find no value discount associated with the presence of golden shares. On the 
contrary, we find a positive and generally significant association between government control rights 
and peer-adjusted valuations. Stronger evidence is obtained when we control for endogeneity of 
governments’ voting rights. Our results contrast with earlier studies of privatizations which suggest 
that government control hurts firm performance (Boardman and Vining, 1989, Dewenter and 
Malatesta, 2001).  
While the results do not support the political interference hypothesis, they suggest that a large 
government stake may be beneficial to privatized companies. We are able to rule out that this result is 
driven by the rents provided by the State to some protected industries, or by the agency costs of 
private ownership. On the other hand, we uncover one possible source of gain for privatized firms in 
which the government maintains large control stakes: government aid. In fact, we document that 
14.29% of privatized firms that remain under government control receive a government bailout over 
the period studied, versus “only” 6.52% of more fully privatized firms. 
Our approach simultaneously addresses a number of additional conceptual and methodological 
issues present in existing studies. First, we address the important issue of the selection of appropriate 
benchmark private firms. This is a particularly difficult task in developing countries, which have 
narrow capital markets with few listed companies. On the other hand, by focusing on developed 
countries, with relatively larger stock markets, we are able to find a suitable set of peers. In particular, 
we compare privatized firms to a sample of industry, country, and size-matched private peers.  We 
also show that our results are robust to the choice of different benchmarks based on market and sector 
                                                 
6 Our approach is complementary to Gupta (2005), who compares partially privatized firms and completely 
State-owned firms in India. A difference is that we compare partially privatized firms to private firms (rather 
than to fully government controlled companies) in order to provide a clean test of the political interference 
hypothesis.   5
statistics. Additionally, previous studies do not generally control for potential endogeneity in the 
decision to privatize firms. We instead address the endogeneity issue by using valid instrumental 
variables to estimate the relationship between firm value and government control.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe the sample and data 
employed in the study. In section III, we discuss the ultimate control structure of privatized and 
matching firms, as well as the diffusion of golden shares. Section IV addresses the issue of the 
convergence in the value of privatized and matching firms. Section V a likely explanation for our 
results and Section VI provides robustness tests. Section VII concludes the paper.  
 
II.  Data 
A. Privatized companies and control sample 
The complete list of privatization transactions in public equity markets in OECD economies 
before 1/1/1997 is obtained from the Global New Issues Database of Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC). Privatization transactions are defined as primary or secondary issues of shares on a public 
equity market by companies where central or local governments act as shareholders. Our source 
provides us with a list of 299 privatization transactions, 44% of which are IPOs. As it is widely 
documented, the sheer size of the companies has often forced divesting governments to privatize by 
sequencing multiple tranches. In fact, the privatizations reported refer to 205 individual companies, 
involved in 1.4 issues on average. We cross check the presence of these companies both in the 
Privatization International (PI) Database and in Megginson’s Appendix.
8 All the companies in our list 
are also reported in the PI dataset and appear in Megginson’s Appendix. We then compare the data 
obtained from SDC with the information from selected official sources, such as the Italian Ministry of 
the Economy and Finance, the British HM Treasury, and Spanish SEPI, and other privatization 
agencies. After this double check, we conclude that our initial sample includes 98% of companies 
privatized in public equity markets in OECD economies prior to 1997. 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 Several studies have documented performance increases around the so-called privatization date (e.g., 
Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh, 1994, Boubakri and Cosset, 1998, D’Souza and Megginson, 1999). 
See also Megginson and Netter (2001) for an excellent review of this literature.   6
For each privatized firm, a match is identified as any company from the same country and 
Campbell’s (1996) industry as the privatized firm. Among all eligible firms, we select the one with 
the total equity market capitalization closest to that of the privatized firm, as of year-end 1996, as long 
as its market capitalization is within a +/-30% range. If no company satisfies these criteria, we then 
select the firm with the closest market capitalization (in the +/-30% range) to the privatized company 
using Campbell’s industry classification, but from any country. If this results in no match for a 
privatized firm, we then pick the domestic firm with the market capitalization closest to our privatized 
firm as of the end of 1996, in the +/-30% range, regardless to its industry. Whenever the government 
shows up as shareholder for a matching firm, we replace it with the next size match.  
After the matching procedure described above, and after requiring that ownership data be 
available, we end up with a final sample of 141 firms privatized before 1/1/1997, and 141 matching 
companies. The majority of the firms in the control group (68 per cent) are matched with the first best 
case, 30 per cent with the second best case, and only one with the third best case.  
To address the possible bias associated with having a matching company from a different 
country, in Section VI.A we alternatively benchmark each accounting item for each privatized firm 
against its industry and country median. As we will show, our results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
For all companies included in the study, financial data for the period 1996-2000 is obtained 
from Worldscope. Name changes and acquisitions are tracked using the information contained in 
Worldscope, Extel, and SDC. In the case of mergers and acquisitions, we track the ownership of the 
bidder or the company resulting from the merger. If the privatized company merged with or was 
acquired by a private company not included in the control sample, and was consequently de-listed or 
listed with shares registered under a new name, we consider as a “privatized company” either the 
newly created company or the acquirer of the privatized company itself, provided their shares trade on 
the stock market where the privatized company was initially floated. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/M/William.L.Megginson-1/   7
B. Control structures: Data and examples 
We employ the sources listed in Appendix A to measure the ultimate control (voting) rights of 
the largest shareholders for all privatized and matching companies, as of the end 1996 and 2000. 
Corporate control is measured in terms of voting rights, following the procedure employed in previous 
studies by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), and 
Faccio and Lang (2002). For example, if a family owns 50% of Firm X, which owns 30% of Firm Y, 
then we posit that this family controls 30% of Firm Y (the percentage is determined by the weakest 
link along the control chain). As discussed in detail later, ultimate control is defined at the 10% cut-
off level, i.e. we posit that a company has a large shareholder whenever anyone directly or indirectly 
controls at least 10% of voting rights. In addition, for the privatized companies, full information on 
ownership restrictions, voting caps, and special powers granted to the State are collected from the 
privatization prospectuses.  
Two examples show that privatized companies may have quite complex control structures. The 
following privatized firms are selected: Deutsche Lufthansa AG (Germany), and SGS-Thomson 
Microelectronics (now STMicroelectronics, France). 
[Figure 1 goes here] 
Figure 1 depicts the control structure of Lufthansa, Germany's largest airline, as of end 1996. 
The company has five direct shareholders: Deutsche Postbank, Deutsche Bahn, KfW, the State of 
North Rhine-Westphalia and MGL. Deutsche Postbank, Deutsche Bahn, KfW are government-
majority controlled firms. The State of North Rhine-Westphalia is a local government authority. MGL 
is a publicly traded company with two main shareholders: Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale (with 
a 44.5% control stake) and Dresdner Bank (also with a 44.5% control stake). Bayerische Landesbank, 
in turn, is 50% controlled by the State of Bavaria (a local government authority) and 50% controlled 
by the Association of Bavarian Saving Banks. Dresdner Bank is 22% controlled by Allianz (which is 
part of a complex cross-holding).  
Lufthansa has three ultimate shareholders with the 10% cutoff rule: Allianz, which indirectly 
controls 10.05% of votes (the minimum among 10.05%, 44.5% and 22%), the Association of 
Bavarian Saving Banks, which controls 10.05% of votes (the minimum among 10.05%, 44.5% and   8
50%), and the German government, which controls 50.70%
9 of the votes. The State is thus 
Lufthansa’s (largest) controlling shareholder. Notice that we would have ended up with a Government 
stake of only 1.77% had we focused on direct ownership – as almost all privatization studies do. 
 [Figure 2 goes here] 
Figure 2 illustrates the control structure of STmicroelectronics N.V. (formerly known as SGS-
Thomson Microelectronics N.V.) as of mid-1996. STmicroelectronics manufactures and supplies a 
broad range of semi-conductor integrated circuits and discrete devices. The company’s control 
structure involves complex pyramids. The bottom left side of the figure depicts the stakes that can be 
traced back to the French government. The right side reports the chains that trace back to the Italian 
government. The French government indirectly controls SGS through three (100%) government 
controlled firms: SOGEPA, CEA and France Telecom. CEA (through CEA Industries) and France 
Telecom fully control FT1CI, which has a 50.1% stake in FT2CI. So, they indirectly control 50.1% of 
FT2CI (min(100%, 50.1%)). SOGEPA indirectly controls the remaining 49.9% (min(49.9%, 58%, 
100%)) of FT2CI. Thus, overall, the French government controls 100% of FT2CI (50.1%+49.9%). In 
turn, FT2CI indirectly controls 50% (min(69.4%,100%, 50%)) of SGS-Thomson Microelectronics. 
Thus we posit that the French government controls 50% of SGS (min(50%,100%)). 
The Italian government, on the other hand, indirectly controls SGS through IRI and Comitato 
SIR (two firms that it wholly owns). IRI has a 50.1% stake in MEI, while Comitato SIR holds the 
remaining 49.9%. Thus, through these two companies, the Italian government controls 100% of 
MEI’s votes. MEI, in turn, has a 50% stake in SGS-Thomson Microelectronics Holding NV, who 
controls 100% of SGS-Thomson Microelectronics Holding BV which, in turn, has a 69.4% stake in 
SGS-Thomson Microelectronics NV. Thus, through this pyramid, the Italian government also controls 
50% of SGS-Thomson Microelectronics NV’s voting capital (min(69.4%, 100%, 50%, 100%)). This 
company is therefore under full government control, albeit two different nations are involved. Overall, 
we have more than one government entity only in a handful of cases. Thus, our treatment of these 
                                                 
9 [1.03% (min (100%, 1.03%)) + 0.4% (min (100%, 0.4%)) +37.45% (min (80%, 37.45%)) +1.77% + 10.05% 
(min (10.05%, 44.5%, 50%))]   9
observations cannot materially affect the results.We believe the extremely small sample size would 
render any inference or conclusion inappropriate. 
 
III. The ultimate control structure of privatized and matching firms 
A.  Evolution of control structures 
Following previous research, we classify ultimate owners into the following six types: 
- State: A national government, a local authority (county, municipality, etc.), or a government agency; 
- Family: A family or a firm that is unlisted on any stock exchange; 
- Widely held corporation: A non-financial firm, defined as widely held (that is, no shareholder 
controls 10% or more of the votes);  
- Widely held financial institution: A financial firm (SIC 6000-6999) that is widely held;  
- Miscellaneous: Charities, voting trusts, employees, cooperatives, foundations, or minority foreign 
investors; 
- Cross-holdings: Firm X is controlled by another firm, Y, which is in turn controlled by X, or directly 
controls at least 10% of its own stock. 
If the ultimate owner of a corporation is an unlisted firm, we trace back its owners using all 
available data sources. This was not always possible because most of our sample countries do not 
require unlisted firms to disclose their owners. Companies that do not have a shareholder controlling 
at least 10% of votes are classified as widely held. 
[Table I goes here] 
Table I analyzes the ultimate controlling owners of privatized and matching corporations under 
the 10 percent rule. Panel A shows that the State is the most common type of ultimate owner for 
privatized firms. This is true both as of the end of 1996, when 34.75% of privatized firms have the 
State as largest ultimate owner, and as of the end of 2000, when the government is the largest ultimate 
owner in 29.79% of cases.
10 Thus, even after privatization, almost one third of firms remain 
government-controlled. A large fraction of privatized companies do not have a controlling shareholder 
                                                 
10 Thus, the percentage of firms for which the government is the major shareholder declined through time by   10
under the 10 percent rule, and are therefore labeled as “widely held”. The proportion of widely held 
companies increases through time amongst privatized firms (27.66% in 1996, and 30.50% in 2000), 
although insignificantly so. Amongst privatized firms, the second most important type of ultimate 
owner is families and unlisted companies. Families control 16.31% of firms in 1996, and 19.86% in 
2000. Widely held financial institutions are also relatively frequent large shareholders, and include 
17.02% of cases in 1996 and in 9.93% of cases in 2000. Widely held corporations, miscellaneous 
investors, and cross-holdings appear to play a substantially more marginal role. 
The ownership of matching firms exhibits a slightly different pattern (see Table I, Panel B). By 
construction, the government never is the largest shareholder in the matching sample. Most of these 
companies are widely held (37.59% of cases in 1996 and 41.84% in 2000). Families are the second 
most important type of investors. They are the largest shareholder in 35.46% of cases in 1996, and 
28.37% of cases in 2000. Widely held financial institutions are also relatively important, being the 
largest shareholders for 19.86% of all matching firms in 1996, and for 11.35% of peers in 2000. Once 
again, widely held corporations, miscellaneous investors, and cross-holdings play a minor role, 
although the former two investor types are definitely more common amongst matching than amongst 
privatized firms.  
A comparison between privatized and matching firms (Panel C) shows some convergence in 
their control structures. From 1996 to 2000, the differences in the percentage of firms controlled by 
families, widely held financial institutions, and miscellaneous shareholders decline or become 
insignificant. However, the differences in the percentage of firms controlled by widely held 
corporations, as well as the differences in the percentage of widely held firms, increase. 
[Table II goes here] 
Table II shows that, on average, in 1996 the largest ultimate controlling shareholder controlled 
27.80% of voting rights of privatized firms. This percentage marginally declines to 25.51% as of the 
end of 2000. In 1996, control rights are more diffuse for the control sample, where we find that the 
largest shareholder on average controls 21.10% of votes. This proportion, however, increases 
substantially by the end of 2000, when the largest shareholder controls 26.37% of votes. As a 
                                                                                                                                                        
4.96 percentage points.   11
consequence, we observe a convergence in the concentration of voting power between privatized and 
matching firms. This convergence, however, comes from changes in the control structure of matching 
firms, which becomes much more concentrated.  
Most importantly for our purposes, we show that amongst companies in which the government 
is the largest shareholder, government control rights average 51.27% at the end of 1996, and 52.18% 
at the end of 2000. So, in these companies, not only the government is the largest shareholder, but on 
average it controls the majority of votes.  
We find a widespread use of control enhancing devices (e.g., pyramids, cross-holdings or dual-
class share structures) among privatized firms in which the government is the largest shareholder: in 
1996, 53.06% of these firms (vs. 30.61% of their matching peers) had in place some control 
enhancing device; in 2000, 52.38% of government controlled firms (vs. only 33.33% of their peers) 
were using such instruments. Had we not considered these mechanisms, the average government 
control rights would have been of only 43.01% (rather than 51.27%) in 1996, and 37.14% (rather than 
52.18%) in 2000. This indicates that previous studies that only focus on direct ownership substantially 
understate the magnitude of government powers. 
 
B. Golden shares 
The analysis of control rights does not provide a full picture of the real power wielded by the 
government shareholder, who can grant itself wide discretionary powers over partially or even fully 
privatized firms by the use of golden shares. 
We define golden share as the system of the State’s special powers and statutory constraints on 
privatized companies. Typically, special powers include (i) the right to appoint members in corporate 
boards; (ii) the right to consent to or to veto the acquisition of relevant interests in the privatized 
companies; (iii) other rights such as to consent to the transfer of subsidiaries, dissolution of the 
company, ordinary management, etc. The above mentioned rights may be temporary or not. On the 
other hand, statutory constraints include (i) ownership limits; (ii) voting caps; (iii) national control 
provisions.   12
This set of powers and constraints may stem from the possession of a redeemable special share, 
from limitations imposed by the privatized company’s statutes, often in accordance with the 
privatization law, or from the possession of special class shares.  
Golden shares have different institutional characteristics in different countries. For example, in 
the U.K., the prior consent of the special shareholder is normally required for any change in the 
ownership limitations in the Articles of Association, which usually prevent a person - or persons 
acting in concert - from having an interest of 15% or more in the voting share capital. The articles 
defining rights attached to the special share cannot be altered or removed. The special shares do not 
carry any rights to vote at general meetings, but they do entitle the holder to attend and speak at such 
meetings. The special share in this “basic” form applies to British Aerospace (now BAE Systems) 
British Energy, Southern Electric, and National Grid Group Plc. The rights attached to the special 
share are wider only in a few cases where a national “strategic” interest can be identified. The French 
action spécifique is particularly diversified. In general, prior approval of the Minister is required if 
persons or entities are to hold more than a certain percent of the capital or voting rights (10% for Elf 
Aquitaine (now Total), Havas, and Thomson-CSF (now Thales)). Usually a representative of the 
French Government is appointed to the Board of Directors to act on behalf of the Minister. In some 
cases he has limited veto power (i.e. for Elf Aquitaine, to block the sale of certain strategic assets), 
while in others he can veto any board resolution (Thomson-CSF). In Turkey, in some cases special 
powers are so extensive that they involve government in ordinary management.  
Listed companies are required to fully disclose the presence of golden share provisions in their 
prospectuses. We have therefore solicited privatization prospectuses from individual companies, 
investment banks, security exchange commissions, and privatization agencies. We have been able to 
obtain 104 prospectuses out of our sample of 141 companies privatized in OECD countries in the 
1977-2000 period.
11 We then identified the presence of golden shares in the company’s prospectus.  
[Table III goes here] 
                                                 
11 Detailed institutional information about golden shares can be found from some official web sites (such as the 
HM Treasury in the United Kingdom, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk, the Spanish Sociedad Estatal de 
Participaciones Industriales, www.sepi.es, the Austrian Holding and Privatisation Agency, www.oiag.at).   13
Table III documents the diffusion of golden shares amongst privatized firms. We find that 
62.5% of such firms have outstanding golden shares as of the end of 1996. Special powers are quite 
frequent and appear in 39.42% of privatized companies. Additionally, in a number of cases privatized 
companies’ statutes set upper limits on the individual ownership or voting rights that can be acquired 
without government approval. In some cases, these limitations only apply to ownership held by 
foreign investors. It is common for the privatized company’s statute to require the headquarters to be 
located in the country of incorporation or for it to require the board members to be citizens of the 
country of incorporation. 
Golden shares are more common amongst companies in which the government is not the largest 
shareholder. As reported in Table III, as of the end of 1996, golden shares were present in 56.41% of 
the 39 companies under government control (under the 10% rule), and in 66.15% of the remaining 65 
firms in which the government was not the largest shareholder. A similar picture comes out at the end 
of 2000, when golden shares are present in 57.58% of companies in which the government was the 
largest shareholder, and in 64.79% of firms in which the government does not control at least 10% of 
votes. 
Table III shows that, through ownership or golden shares, the government controls 65.2% of 
privatized firms as of the end of 1996, and 62.4% of privatized firms as of the end of 2000. This 
evidence clearly indicates that, in the majority of cases, the “privatization” process was not followed 
by a complete relinquishment of power by the State. 
[Table IV goes here] 
Table IV shows that government reluctance to privatize is particularly common in some sectors, 
such as basic industries, in which 84.6% of the privatized companies have golden shares or have the 
government as largest shareholder. Other industries that are similarly dominated by the government 
after privatization are leisure (100%), petroleum (77.8%), services (100%), textile and trade (100%), 
transportation (70.6%), and utilities (77.1%). Government ownership, special powers, and statutory 
constraints are quite absent in the financial sector, appearing “only” in 35.3% of the companies.  
Panel B of Table IV provides the breakdown by country. It indicates that privatizations have 
been particularly reluctant in Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece and Ireland where, as of the end of   14
1996, the government was still the largest shareholder or held special powers in all former SOEs. On 
the other hand, the privatization process had been more complete in Australia, Mexico, the 
Netherlands and Portugal. In the UK the government often held golden shares in privatized 
companies, while it divested all voting rights.  
 
IV.  Valuation of privatized and matching firms          
A.  Univariate results 
Table V reports company market-to-book (MB) ratios.
12 The MB ratio is defined as the ratio of 
market value of ordinary and preferred equity to the book value of equity. Since these firms’ debt is 
for the most part privately held, we do not have a market value for this item. We cannot therefore 
compute a market-to-book value of total assets. For the whole sample, we find that privatized 
companies are significantly less valuable than their peers in terms of MB ratio in every year 
considered (Panel A). However, the difference in the average (median) MB ratio declines from a 
maximum of -1.38 (-0.93) in 1997 to a minimum of -0.61 (-0.16) in 2000. Thus, we find that the 
market value of privatized firms converges toward the valuation levels of their matching peers. We 
will show later that this result is not driven by our choice of peer companies. 
[Table V goes here] 
Panels B and C in Table V separately report the MB ratio of privatized companies that are still 
under government control (as of the end of 1996) and those in which the government is no longer the 
largest shareholder. Interestingly, the valuation of government controlled firms is closer to that of 
their matching peers than to the valuation of more fully privatized companies.
13 For example, in 1996, 
the difference between the average (median) MB ratio of privatized firms still under government 
control and the MB ratio of their matching peers was -0.55 (-0.35); at the same time, the difference 
between the average (median) MB ratio of privatized companies that are no longer under government 
control and the MB ratio of their matching peers was -1.50 (-0.94). All these differences were 
                                                 
12 A problem of WorldScope data is the presence of outliers. All balance-sheet variables have therefore been 
trimmed by dropping observations below the 2nd and above the 98th percentile. 
13 The treatment of golden shares does not affect this conclusion.   15
significant at the .01 level. As of 2000, the difference between the average (median) MB ratio of 
privatized firms still under government control and the MB ratio of their matching peers was -0.48 
(0.45), while the difference between the average (median) MB ratio of privatized companies that are 
no longer under government control and the MB ratio of their matching peers was -0.68 (-0.31). None 
of these differences are significant at the .10 level or better.  
 
B.  Multivariate analysis 
The results of the univariate analysis suggest that the valuation of privatized and matching firms 
tend to converge over time, but that government’s willingness to relinquish control does not seem to 
explain the speed of convergence. In particular, the presence of the State as the largest ultimate 
shareholder does not affect negatively the adjusted market value of State-owned enterprises. On the 
contrary, privatized companies that are more tightly controlled by the State have an average market-
to-book closer to that of their private counterparts. 
These preliminary results are quite surprising and they suggest a need for a thorough empirical 
test of the role of government control in the valuation of firms. To proceed in that direction, some 
additional data collection is needed. First, we have to track changes in governments’ direct and 
indirect ownership in our sample of privatized firms. These changes in direct stake may be due to 
further privatization sales, to primary stock issues, or to acquisitions of the company’s shares by the 
government or other public entities. Obviously when pyramiding occurs, changes in the ownership 
structure have to be identified along the entire control chain in order to obtain data on control rights 
that is consistent with the data analyzed in section II. Second, a set of economic and financial 
variables has to be constructed to control for firm-specific time varying effects. 
We investigate the average impact of changes in government control rights on the adjusted 
valuation of privatized firms by estimating the following specification: 
   it i it it t i it SPECIAL STATE Dx Dy υ δ γ β α α + + + + + = ' ,      (1)   16
where  it Dy  is the difference between the valuation (market-to-book, MB) of the privatized company 
and its matching peer,  it Dx  is the vector of control variables, STATE is the share of control rights held 
by the government in the privatized company,
14 SPECIAL is a dummy taking the value one when the 
special powers are granted to the State,
15 αi is the fixed effect, and αt is a vector of time dummies to 
capture year effects. Cross-sectional units are the pairs comprising the privatized company and its 
match. Thus the fixed effect captures these pair-specific effects. 
As to control variables, we use a large set of financial variables constructed by taking 
differences between the privatized and matching companies, using Worldscope data. Since a valuation 
differential might be explained by differences in the company size, matching firms were selected 
within in a range of +/- 30 percent of the privatized firm's market capitalization in the initial year. 
However, size can vary considerably over time. We therefore control for this effect with the variable 
DSIZE, which is the difference between the (log of) the end of year market capitalizations. Leverage 
has also been shown to matter in the valuation of firms, so the debt-to-equity ratio (DDEBT) is 
included. Difference in market value could also be ascribed to the degree of efficiency with which the 
companies use their assets. Therefore, we construct DASSETURN, the ratio of sales to total assets, to 
measure how many times the privatized company turns over its assets relative to the matching firm. 
Finally, we control for the effect of differences in investment, as measured by differences in the ratio 
of total capital expenditure to sales (DCAPEX). Series for all these variables have been computed for 
the period 1996-2000. The choice of the market-to-book as a measure of valuation and the inclusion 
of most of these controls are rather standard in the literature (see, for example, Lang, Ofek and Stulz, 
1996, McConnell and Servaes, 1990, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988).  
The market value of privatized firms might be affected by their industry sector. Indeed, some 
former State monopolies operating in energy, transportation, telecommunications, and utilities, are 
considered strategically important for the national economy and are often shielded from competition. 
                                                 
14 Since, by construction, the government never shows up as controlling owner of matching firms, the variable 
STATE can be interpreted as the difference between government ownership in privatized and government 
ownership in matching firms. A similar interpretation applies to SPECIAL. 
15 Golden share mechanisms are strongly correlated. We therefore decided to include in the regression analysis 
only the dummy SPECIAL, which occurs more frequently, to avoid multicollinearity problems. The choice of a 
different golden share dummy does not qualitatively affect our results.   17
Furthermore, they may enjoy favourable treatment by the State in terms of favorable regulatory 
treatment, guaranteed business, contracts, etc. Thus higher valuation could stem from the presence of 
rents and special benefits that are granted to privatized companies and not to their private competitors. 
We partially control for this factor by using dummy variables based on two-digit SIC codes for three 
sectors that are more heavily regulated and less competitive (PETROLEUM,  TRANSPORT, and 
UTILITIES).  
Equation (1) has been estimated by using random effects models, which assume that 
( )
2 , 0 ~ α σ α IID i  and  ( )
2 , 0 ~ υ σ υ IID it . In order to assess the consistency of the random effects, we 
have performed a Hausman (1978) specification test, under the null of non-systematic differences in 
the coefficients of the fixed and random effects models. If they do not differ statistically, the random-
effects model is more efficient. Clearly, the test is performed only on the coefficients of the time-
varying variables included in both models. 
Table VI presents the results of the regression analysis. Columns (1) to (5) report the estimated 
coefficients of OLS models. We first run a basic specification with a set of control variables and then 
add our two measures for government (direct and indirect) control rights, and SPECIAL. Finally, we 
add our sector dummies as additional controls in these specifications. We have opted for parsimonious 
specifications since the number of observations shrinks rapidly when additional control variables are 
included. We report the estimated coefficients of the set of control variables that yielded the most 
interesting results. However, the point estimates of the two main variables are not affected by the 
choice of different controls. 
[Table VI goes here] 
Table VI partially confirms the preliminary evidence from the univariate analysis. Contrary to 
general expectations, the size of government’s residual stake (STATE) does not seem to negatively 
affect relative valuation. On the contrary, when we control for the presence of special powers 
(regressions 3 and 5), we find a positive and significant coefficient on the variable STATE. This 
suggests that a higher stake brings the privatized company’s market-to-book closer to its private   18
match. Equally surprisingly, we show that special powers do not negatively and significantly impact 
corporate valuation.  
Our control variables yield some interesting results, too. The coefficients of the difference in 
company size and asset turnover are always positive and highly statistically significant. We report 
also some weaker evidence on the role of leverage in corporate valuation: we find a lower difference 
in the debt-to-equity ratio associated with a large difference in market value, a finding that is 
consistent with several previous studies. Interestingly, the State does not appear to provide rents to 
companies operating in more regulated and less competitive sectors. In fact, our sector dummies are 
insignificantly (or negatively) related to relative valuation. More important, the relationship between 
market-to-book ratios and government stakes remains significant when these additional control 
variables are added. 
 
C.  Endogeneity of government control rights 
Conceptually, the OLS estimation of Equation (1) can be affected by a simultaneity bias (Caves 
and Christensen, 1980, Martin and Parker, 1995, and Kole and Mulherin, 1997). As pointed out by 
Megginson and Netter (2001), “there are generally fundamental reasons why certain firms are 
government owned… These factors that determine whether the firm is publicly or privately owned 
likely also have significant effect on performance.” Indeed, a government may attempt to privatize, 
and therefore to reduce its stake in the SOE at times when the company is more valuable due to 
superior predicted profitability. Further, governments may have certain characteristics that are 
associated with privatization. If error terms are correlated with residual stakes, consistent estimates 
can be obtained through two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation, using a vector of exogenous 
instruments. 
Possible valid instruments to cope with our endogeneity problem are the partisan orientation of 
governments, political-institutional indexes, and public finance variables (Bortolotti et al., 2003; 
Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2003). Political orientation is captured by a variable (PARTISAN) that ranges 
from 0 (extreme left of the political spectrum) to 10 (extreme right), measured by the weighted   19
average of scores given in expert surveys to the parties supporting government, as in Huber and 
Inglehart (1995). Weights are the number of seats obtained by each party as a percentage of total seats 
of the ruling coalition. The political-institutional index (POLINST) has been developed in comparative 
political science and it allows categorization of countries on a majoritarian-consensual dimension (see 
Lijphart 1999). POLINST is the average of a disproportionality index, the effective number of parties, 
and a measure of government stability (see Lijphart 1999). The political indexes are based on 
electoral data and display variability both over time and cross-sectionally.
16 The public finance 
variable is the debt-to-GDP ratio.  
[Table VII goes here] 
Table VII reports the two-stage least squares coefficients of the same models estimated by OLS. 
The results of the first stage regression are quite interesting per se and suggest that partisan politics 
and political institutions matter in explaining the government’s willingness to relinquish control. 
Governments leaning toward the right of the political spectrum are associated with lower residual 
stakes in privatized companies, as are majoritarian countries. These results are broadly consistent with 
results of previous work showing that the extent of a country’s privatization (measured as revenues 
scaled by GDP) is associated with right-wing governments and with majoritarian political systems in 
OECD countries (Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2003). Overall, the high joint statistical significance of the 
first-stage regression indicates that these variables may be valid instruments for government control 
rights. We confirmed the validity of our instruments by running a Sargan (1958) test of over-
identified restrictions.  
When we control for endogeneity, the previous result showing an association between the role 
of government control rights and firm value is strengthened. The coefficient of the fitted value of 
variable STATE is always positive and statistically significant at the .05 level. The absolute value of 
the coefficient suggests that the effect of a decrease of government control rights may be 
economically relevant. For example, a reduction in government ownership of 10% is associated with a 
decrease of approximately 0.6 (-10 X 0.06) in the adjusted market-to-book ratio. Quite strikingly, our 
                                                 
16 For a more accurate description of these political and institutional variables and sources see Bortolotti and 
Pinotti (2003).    20
data seem to suggest that larger government stakes do not reduce the market valuation of State-owned 
enterprises. Rather, fully divested companies appear to be on average less valuable. This result is 
robust to the inclusion of special powers of the State as an additional regressor (which is again 
insignificant) and to changes in the choice of instrumental variables. The coefficients on the other 
firm level control variables confirm the previous results, with size and asset turnover explaining a 
large fraction of the variance in valuation differentials. The effect of government ownership survives 
when our sector dummies are included, suggesting that higher market-to-book ratios are not driven by 
lack of competition or weak regulation. 
 
V.  Why are government-controlled privatized companies worth more? The role of bailouts 
A natural question relates to the source of gains for privatized firms that remain under 
government control. What are the channels through which governments can make the companies they 
own more valuable? Potential benefits include shielding privatized companies from competition, 
affording them a favorable regulatory environment, subsidizing loans, guaranteeing contracts, or 
providing financial assistance when facing difficult times. Our regression results did not provide any 
evidence about the role of market structure in explaining valuation differentials. Indeed, the inclusion 
of sector dummies for companies operating in more concentrated and heavily regulated industries did 
not sweep out the statistical significance of government control rights. Thus, assuming government 
controlled firms enjoy special benefits, the results indicate that these benefits do not accrue to firms in 
more concentrated industries. 
While identifying subsidized loans, guarantees, and contracts is a practically impossible task, 
recent research has been successful in tracking bailouts. A recent paper by Faccio, Masulis and 
McConnell (2005), who study the incidence of bailouts amongst politically-connected firms, 
document a higher frequency of bailouts amongst privatized companies. However, since their study 
only includes a small sample of privatized firms, no conclusive evidence is documented as to whether 
governments are more likely to bail out firms in which they have large control stakes. To address this 
question, we replicate their analysis for our whole sample of privatized companies.   21
Following Faccio et al. (2005), we focus on financially troubled firms that receive a transfer 
payment or capital infusion from their home government. To identify such firms, we conduct keyword 
searches of Factiva over the period January 1, 1996, through December 31, 2000 using the name of 
each of our privatized companies along with the terms “bailout,” “bail-out,” “bailed out,” “rescue,” 
“rescue package,” “injection,” “restructur*” and “aid” and the words “government” or “State.” Given 
this set of bailout candidates, we verified from Factiva news articles that the deal in question involved 
a funds transfer (or capital infusion) to the company from its home government. We find that 13 out 
of 141 privatized firms (9.22%) are bailed out over the period studied. Bailouts are substantially more 
common among government controlled firms: 14.29% of these are in fact bailed out over the 1996-
2000 period, versus a meager 6.52% for privatized companies without governments as largest 
shareholders. Although we recognize that in many European Union countries regulations aimed at 
limiting financial aid from the government exist and have become more stringent over time, our 
results show that space for occasional help to firms still exists, and aid is not totally uncommon, as 
often alleged and criticized in the press. The recent bailouts of Alstom, the French transport and 
power manufacturer, and of Alitalia, the Italian flagship carrier, are cases in point. 
To have a benchmark comparison for our control group, we compute the likelihood of a 
bailout for private companies using the figures reported in Faccio et al. (2005). In particular, we focus 
on bailouts of companies without political ties (since here we are interested to estimate bailouts 
amongst firms that were never government owned), from the OECD countries. For that sample, their 
figures allow us to estimate that, over a 5 year period, 2.69% of companies will be bailed out from 
their home government. Clearly the frequency of bailouts we document is much higher. This is the 
case both for privatized firms that remain under government control and for more fully privatized 
firms, although the results are certainly much more dramatic for the former. 
Given the higher probability of a bailout, privatized firms that remain under government 
control will face –ceteris paribus– a lower bankruptcy risk with respect to companies privatized more 
fully, and this will push market valuation.  Indeed, creditors will factor into their lending decisions the 
likelihood that government controlled firms will be bailed out when they encounter economic distress 
and, thus, will provide more funds to these firms and/or afford them more favorable rates.  This result   22
provides a plausible explanation for the positive relation between government control rights and firm 
value that we document.  
 
VI.  Robustness tests  
A. Alternative benchmarks. 
To assess the robustness of our results, we re-run our tests after benchmarking the privatized 
companies against a different control sample. In particular, instead of identifying a matching firm for 
each privatized company based on country, industry and size, we compare the financials of each 
privatized firm to the median values for the companies in their same country and two-digit SIC 
industry. By doing that, we no longer have cases where the country of the privatized firm differs from 
the country of its matching peer. We then re-run all (two-stage) regressions presented in Table VII. 
The new results in Table VIII unequivocally show that the choice of the benchmark does not drive of 
our earlier results. It suffices to notice here that government voting rights remain positively and 
significantly related to firm value in all regressions. Once again we fail to document a significant 
relationship between the company’s market-to-book ratio and the presence of golden share 
mechanisms.  
[Table VIII goes here] 
B. Agency costs 
A primary concern is that our results may be driven by the agency costs associated with diffuse 
(private) ownership. Since the publication of the two seminal papers by Berle and Means (1932) and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), it has been generally accepted that diffuse ownership exposes minority 
shareholders to the risk of expropriation by managers. Therefore, fully privatized firms may be more 
valuable due to reduced political interference (i.e., governmental agency problem), but these benefits 
may be more than offset by the agency costs of diffuse (or concentrated) private ownership. That is, 
government owned enterprises might perform better not because State-ownership is valuable per se, 
but because the government, as a large shareholder, reduces managerial entrenchment and/or 
expropriation of minority shareholders.    23
To disentangle the effect of ownership concentration from political interference, we run two 
regressions in which we control for ownership concentration by adding a concentration variable. 
DCONC is the difference between the control rights of the largest shareholder in the privatized and 
matching firms. We also include a term for the squared value of the concentration variable, which is a 
standard procedure in the literature to test for non-linear effects (see, for example, McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990). The two terms are intended to capture the beneficial effect of the enhanced 
monitoring associated with concentrated control. In these regressions, the STATE variable now 
reflects only the effect of having the government as a major shareholder, rather than of having any 
major shareholder.  
Complete ownership data for the control group are available only for the initial and final years 
of our sample period (1996 and 2000). We thus run two separate regressions. Results are reported in 
Table IX. All results in the table are second stage estimates, based on first stage regressions that use 
the same set of instruments presented in Table VII. As shown in the results for regression (1), we find 
that government control rights are positively and significantly associated with firm value in 1996. 
However, regression (2) shows that in 2000 this association is not statistically significant.
17 The 
variables DCONC and DCONC
2 are not significantly related to firm value in either year. These results 
do not provide support for the political interference hypothesis. Further, these results allow us to 
conclude that the agency costs of diffuse ownership are not driving value discount that we document 
for more fully privatized firms in the initial years of sample. 
 [Table IX goes here] 
C. The IPO effect 
Another concern is that results could be biased by an omitted variable that reflects the time 
needed for the beneficial effects of a stock market listing to materialize. Indeed, a newly privatized 
firm might have higher potential for efficiency improvements than the private companies in our 
control sample, which may feature a long history of stock trading, research, and analyst coverage. We 
                                                 
17 The year 2000 is also the only year in which the univariate results are marginally significant. Thus, it appears 
that 2000 may be an exceptional year. Unfortunately the data does not allow us to compute the ultimate control 
rights held by the largest shareholder for 1997-1999. Notice that, importantly from our perspective, government 
control rights are never negatively and significantly associated with market to book ratios.   24
control for this effect by adding a variable measuring the difference between the number of years 
from IPO of the privatized and matching firms. IPO dates are identified from Securities Data 
Corporation, national exchanges, privatization prospectuses, the Financial Times, and company 
websites. As regressions (3) and (4) in Table IX show, the results are not driven by an IPO effect. The 
IPO variable is in fact not statistically significant in either model, while the previous results on 
government control rights continue to hold.  
 
D. A temporary outcome? 
In this section we show that the ownership structures reported in the paper are not temporary 
outcomes. To address this issue, we first focus on the first three privatizations that occurred in each of 
our sample countries (or fewer, if we have less than 3 deals in the sample). We find that companies 
privatized first are not less likely to be government owned than other former SOEs. In particular, we 
find that (as of the end of 2000), the government is still the largest shareholder in 42% of firms 
privatized “first” in their country, which is actually a higher figure than that documented earlier 
(Table 1) for the whole sample. This suggests that the reluctance to fully privatize is not due to time 
or weak market constraints. 
As a second approach, we track the ownership structure of 40 (out of 42) partially privatized 
firms as of the end of 2000, until the end of 2005.
18  For 34 out of these 40 companies, we find that 
the government is still a major blockholder, holding on average 39.33 % of voting rights. So, it seem 
that, despite the fact that these “privatizations” had started at least 10 years earlier, governments are 
unwilling to complete their divestiture.  
 
VII.  Conclusions 
We document two new important findings concerning the control and value of privatized firms. 
First, we show that across our sample of OECD countries, the privatization process has been carried 
out reluctantly. By employing the relatively new concept of ultimate control to supplement data on 
changes in the direct ownership of privatized companies, we show that as of the end of 2000,   25
governments are either the largest shareholders or have substantial veto powers in almost two thirds of 
formerly State-owned firms.  
Second, although we document a convergence in privatized company valuations (MB ratios) 
over time toward those of the matched sample, we find that this convergence in market values does 
not depend on the government relinquishing control rights. Rather, a higher percentage of control 
rights held by the government results in privatized companies having higher (peer) adjusted market-
to-book ratios. This result is robust to changes in control variables, to the use of alternative 
benchmarks, and is not affected by reverse causality. Consequently, we reject the political 
interference hypothesis for (partially) privatized companies. 
Our results are not driven by the agency costs associated with private ownership, or by benefits 
provided to former monopolies, such as those in the energy, transportation or utilities sectors. On the 
other hand, it is possible that governments provide special benefits to the privatized firms in which 
they retain significant control, regardless of industry. Indeed, we provide evidence that privatized 
firms that remain under government control are substantially more likely to receive financial aid when 
facing financial trouble (in the form of a government bailout) than their more fully privatized 
counterparts. Although the available data does not allow us to evaluate all possible forms of 
government support, the evidence presented suggests that these benefits are one of the sources of the 
positive relation between government control rights and firm value that we document.  
                                                                                                                                                        
18 We were unable to obtain current ownership data for 2005 for two of the firms in the sample.   26
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Appendix A: Data Sources 
Panel A: Ownership Data 
Country  Data Sources for 1996:  Data Sources for 2000: 
Australia  Australian Stock Exchange, 1997, “ASX all Ordinary Index. Company 
Handbook”, Sydney, N.S.W. 
http://www.companies.govt.nz/search/cad/dbssiten.main 
Austria  Wiener Börse, 1997, “Yearbook 1996”, Österreichische Vereinigung für 
Finanzanalyse, Wien 
Wiener Börse, 2001, “Yearbook 2000”, Österreichische Vereinigung für 
Finanzanalyse, Wien 
Belgium  Banque Bruxelles Lambert, 1996, “Actionnariat des Sociétés Belges cotées à 
Bruxelles”, Department Etudes et Stratégie. 
Banque Bruxelles Lambert, 2000, “Actionnariat des Sociétés Belges cotées à 
Bruxelles”, Department Etudes et Stratégie. 
http://www.stockexchange.be/enindex.htm 
Canada  The Financial Post, 1996, “Survey of Industrials”  
The Financial Post, 1996, “Survey of Mines and Energy Resources” 
Statistics Canada , 1996, “Inter-corporate Ownership in Canada.” 
Company web sites from: http://www.tse.com/ 
Denmark  Company web sites  Company web sites 
Finland  http://www.huginonline.com/ 
Company web sites from: http://www.hex.fi  
Http://www.huginonline.com/ 
Company web sites from: http://www.hex.fi  




Company web sites from: http://www.euronext.com/fr/ 
Germany  Commerzbank, 1997, “Wer gehört zu Wem,” 19
th edition. 
Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel, “Major Holdings of Voting 
Rights in Officially Listed Companies,” September 1997 
Commerzbank, 2000, “Wer gehört zu Wem,” 20
th edition 
Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel, “Major Holdings of Voting 
Rights in Officially Listed Companies,” December 2000 
Greece  Company web sites  http://www.ase.gr/ 
Ireland  London Stock Exchange, 1997, “The London Stock Exchange Yearbook”  Http://www.hemscott.co.uk/equities/ 
Italy  CONSOB, 1997, “Bollettino – edizione speciale n. 4/97 – Compagine azionaria 
delle società quotate in borsa o ammesse alle negoziazioni nel mercato ristretto 
al 31 dicembre 1996”  
Http://www.consob.it/ 
Japan  Toyo Keizai Shanposha, 1997, “Japan Company Handbook”, Tokyo, Japan, 
Winter Edition. (http://www.toyokeizai.co.jp/english/jch/order/index.html) 
Toyo Keizai Shanposha, 2001, “Japan Company Handbook”, Tokyo, Japan, 
Summer Edition. 
Mexico  Company web sites from: http://www.bmv.com.mx/bmving/index.html  Company web sites from: http://www.bmv.com.mx/bmving/index.html  
Netherlands  Company web sites from: http://www.euronext.com/en/  Company web sites from: http://www.euronext.com/en/ 
New Zealand  Datex, 1997, “New Zealand Directory of Shareholders”  Datex, 2001, “New Zealand Directory of Shareholders” 
Norway  Http://www.huginonline.com/ 
Company web sites from: http://www.ose.no/english/ 
http://www.huginonline.com/ 
Company web sites from: http://www.ose.no/english/  29
Portugal  Bolsa de Valores de Lisboa, 1997, “Sociedades Cotadas 1996”  Bolsa de Valores de Lisboa e Porto, 2000, “Sociedades Cotadas 1999”, CD-rom  
Spain  Comision Nacional del Mercado de Valores, 1996 and 1997, “Participaciones 
significativas en sociedades cotizadas” 
http://www.cnmv.es/english/cnmve.htm 
Sweden Http://www.huginonline.com/ http://www.huginonline.com/ 
Turkey  Company web sites.  The Istanbul Stock Exchange, 2001, “Yearbook of Companies”, available at: 
http://www.ise.org 
UK  London Stock Exchange, 1997, “The London Stock Exchange Yearbook”  http://www.hemscott.co.uk/equities/ 
USA  http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar   http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar  
Ownership information is supplemented with the various companies’ privatization prospectuses, Bankscope, the Economist Intelligence Unit country reports (for Government 
ownership), Extel Financial, Faccio and Lang (2002), Fortune (www.fortune.com), Lexis-Nexis, and Worldscope. 
Panel B: Additional Data 
Accounting and stock market data: 
1.  Worldscope; Datastream 
2.  Company privatization prospectuses and accounts 
 
Data-sets used to track companies (i.e., to identify name changes, M&As, etc…):  
1.  Thomson Financial Securities Data, SDC Platinum™, Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions Database  
2.  Extel Financial 
3.  Sources listed in Panel A  30
Figure 1. The control structure of Deutsche Lufthansa (Germany) as of end 1996  
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Table I. Ultimate Control of Privatized and Matching Firms (Largest Shareholder) 
Data for 141 privatized corporations and 141 matching firms are used to construct this table. The table presents the 
percentage of firms controlled by different controlling owners, using 10% ownership as the threshold. Controlling 
shareholders are classified into six types. State: A national government (domestic or foreign), a local authority (county, 
municipality, etc.), or a government agency. Family: A family (including an individual) or a firm that is unlisted on any 
stock exchange. Widely held financial institution: A financial firm (SIC 6000-6999) that is defined as widely held 
because no shareholder controls 10% or more of the votes; held at the control threshold. Widely held corporation: A 
nonfinancial firm, widely held using the control threshold. Cross-holdings: The firm Y is controlled by another firm, 
that is controlled by Y, or directly controls at least 10% of its own stocks. Miscellaneous: Charities, voting trusts, 
employees, cooperatives, or minority foreign investors. Companies that do not have a shareholder controlling at least 
10% of votes are classified as widely held. 
a, 
b, and 
c denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, 
respectively. Z-statistics for equality of proportions are reported in the table. 
Panel A: Privatized Firms 
— of which:  Time period  Number 
of firms 















End of 1996  141 34.75 16.31 2.84 13.48 2.84 17.02 1.42 0.00 27.66 
End of 2000  141 29.79 19.86 2.84 17.02 4.26 9.93 4.96 0.71 30.50 
Diff ’00-‘96   -4.96  3.55  0.00  3.55  1.42  -7.09 
c 3.55 
c 0.71  2.84 
Z-stat     -0.89 0.77  0.00 0.83  0.64 -1.74 1.69 1.00  0.52 
Panel B: Matching Firms 
— of which:  Time period  Number 
of firms 















End of 1996  141  0.00  35.46 13.48 21.99 2.13 19.86 4.96 0.00 37.59 
End of 2000  141 0.00 28.37 7.09 21.28  8.51  11.35  8.51  1.42  41.84 
Diff ’00-‘96   0.00  -7.09    -6.38 
c -0.71 6.38 
b -8.51 
b 3.55  1.42  4.26 
Z-stat    .  -1.28 -1.76 -0.14 2.39 -1.97 1.19 1.42 0.73 
Panel C: Difference between Privatized and Matching Firms 



















c 0.71  -2.84 -3.55 
c 0.00  -9.93 
c 
Z-stat   7.70 -3.67 -3.26 -1.87 0.38 -0.61  -1.69  .  -1.78 
Diff end 2000   29.79 
a -8.51 
c -4.26 
c -4.26 -4.26 -1.42 -3.55 -0.71  -11.35 
b 
Z-stat   7.02 -1.67 -1.64 -0.91  -1.46  -0.39  -1.19  -0.58 -1.98   33
Table II. Ultimate Control Rights  
Data relating to 141 privatized corporations and 141 matching firms are used to construct this table. Control rights is the 
percentage of voting rights ultimately controlled by the largest controlling shareholder. Government control rights is the 
percentage of voting rights controlled by the Government, whenever a Government shows up as the largest shareholder. 
Private control rights is the percentage of voting rights controlled by the largest shareholder in firms matching those in 
which the Government is the largest shareholder. Firms using control enhancing devices denotes the percentage of 
government-controlled firms (or matching peers) in which the controlling shareholder enhances his/her voting power by 
using pyramids, multiple control chains and/or dual class share structures. Pyramids occur when the controlling 
shareholder owns one corporation through another which he/she does not totally own. Firm Y is held through multiple 
control chains if it has an ultimate owner who controls it via a multitude of control chains, each of which includes at 
least 5% of the voting rights at each link. Dual class shares occur when firms have outstanding stocks with different 
voting and/or cash flow rights. 
a, 
b, and 
c denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Privatized Firms 



















End of 1996  141  27.80  19.99  49  51.27   53.06 
End of 2000  141  25.51  16.16  42  52.18   52.38  
            
Diff ’00-‘96   -2.29         
T-stat   -1.26        
Panel B: Matching Firms 
Country Number 
of firms 













End of 1996  141  21.10  11.92  49  15.67   30.61 
End of 2000  141  26.37  13.40  42  17.76   33.33  
            
Diff ’00-‘96   5.27 
b        
T-stat   2.13        
Panel C: Difference between Privatized and Matching Firms 
Country    Mean control rights      Mean control 
rights 
 
Diff end 1996    6.70
 b     35.50
 a  
T-stat   2.37     9.10  
            
Diff end 2000    -0.86      34.42
 a  
T-stat   -0.28     7.80   
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Table III. “Golden share” Provisions in Privatized Firms 
Golden share is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Government enjoys special powers or if there are other statutory constraints in a privatized company. Special Powers 
is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Government enjoys special powers in privatized companies. Special powers stem from the possession of special class shares and 
from provisions contained in the privatized company’s statute, and they include (i) the right to appoint members in corporate board; (ii) the right to consent to or to veto the 
acquisition of relevant interests in the privatized company; (iii) other rights such as to consent to the transfer of subsidiaries, dissolution of the company, or even ordinary 
management decisions. Statutory constraints include (i) ownership limits; (ii) voting caps; (iii) national control provisions. Ownership limit is a dummy that takes the value of 
1 if the company statute establishes an upper limit on the individual ownership rights that can be acquired without Government consent. Voting Cap is a dummy that takes the 
value of 1 if the company statute establishes an upper limit on the votes that any shareholder may cast at general meetings. Foreign Ownership Limit is a dummy that takes the 
value of 1 if company statute establishes an upper limit on the individual ownership rights that can be acquired by a foreign investor without Government consent. Foreign 
Voting Cap is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the company statute establishes an upper limit on the votes that any foreign shareholder may cast at general meetings. 
National Control is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the company statute prohibits non-residents to acquire a controlling interest in the privatized company. 
Location/Directors’ Nationality is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the company statute requires that the corporate headquarters be located in the country of incorporation 
or that the board members be citizens of the country of incorporation. Gov’t Controlled firms are those whose largest shareholder (at the 10% threshold) is a national 
government (domestic or foreign), a local authority (county, municipality, etc.), or a government agency. All other firms are classified as Non-Gov’t Controlled. 
 
  All Privatized Firms    Gov’t Controlled  Non-Gov’t  Controlled Gov’t  Controlled Non-Gov’t  Controlled 
        (as of end ’96)  (as of end ’00) 
  N  Mean (%)   N  Mean (%)  N  Mean (%)  N  Mean (%)  N  Mean (%) 
Golden  share  104  62.50    39  56.41  65 66.15  33  57.58  71 64.79 
Of  which:                     
Special  Powers:  104  39.42    39  28.21  65 46.15  33  27.27  71 45.07 
Ownership  Limit  99  33.33    38  18.42  61 42.62  32  18.75  67 40.30 
Voting  Cap  99  24.24    39  23.08  60 25.00  33  27.27  66 22.73 
Foreign  Ownership  Limit  99  12.12    38  7.89  61 14.75  32  9.38  67 13.43 
Foreign Voting Cap  97  7.22    37  5.41  60  8.33  31  6.45  66  7.58 
National Control  104  9.52    38  10.53  66  9.09  31  12.90  73  8.22 
Location/Directors’  Nationality  104  9.62    39  5.13  65 12.31  32  6.25  72 11.11 
   35
Table IV. Industry and Country Distribution of Privatized Firms by Control Type 
Gov’t Controlled firms are those whose largest shareholder (at the 10% threshold) is a national government (domestic 
or foreign), a local authority (county, municipality, etc.), or a government agency. Golden share is a dummy that takes 
the value of 1 if the Government enjoys special powers or if there are statutory constraints on privatized companies. 
Industry Classification is based on Campbell (1996. p. 316). 
Panel A: Distribution by Industry 
Industry  
Classification 




(as of end ’96) 
Non-Gov’t 
Controlled  
& No Golden 
Share 
(as of end ’96) 
Obs. in the 
Industry as % 
of all 
Privatizations 
Gov’t Controlled or  
Golden Share as % of 
Privatizations in the 
Industry 
Basic industries  10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 28, 33  11 2  9.2 84.6 
Capital goods   34, 35, 38  2 2  2.8  50.0 
Consumer durables  25, 30, 36, 37, 50, 55, 57  10 5  10.6  66.7 
Construction 15-17,  32,  52  2 1  2.1  66.7 
Finance/real estate  60-69  12 22  24.1 35.3 
Food/tobacco  1, 9, 20, 21, 54  3 2  3.5  60.0 
Leisure  27, 58, 70, 78, 79  3 0  2.1  100.0 
Petroleum 13,  29  7 2  6.4  77.8 
Services  72, 73, 75, 80, 82, 87, 89  2 0  1.4  100.0 
Textiles/trade  22, 23, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59  1 0  0.7  100.0 
Transportation  40-42, 44, 45, 47  12 5  12.1  70.6 
Utilities 46,  48,  49  27 8  24.8  77.1 
Panel B: Distribution by Country 
Country #  of  Obs. 
Obs. in the 
Country as  
% of all  
Privatizations 
Gov’t Controlled 
or Special Powers 
(as of end ’96) 
Non-Gov’t Controlled 
& No Special Powers 
(as of end ’96) 
Gov’t Controlled 
or Special Powers 
as % of Privatizations 
in the Country 
Australia 6  4.3  1  5  16.7 
Austria 11  7.8  9  2  81.8 
Belgium 2  1.4  2  0  100.0 
Canada 9  6.4  4  5  44.4 
Denmark 2  1.4  2  0  100.0 
Finland 4  2.8  4  0  100.0 
France 20  14.2  9  11  45.0 
Germany 10  7.1  5  5  50.0 
Greece 2  1.4  2  0  100.0 
Ireland 2  1.4  2  0  100.0 
Italy 12  8.5  6  6 50.0 
Japan 4  2.8 3  1  75.0 
Mexico 1  0.7  0  1  0.0 
Netherlands 3  2.1  1  2  33.3 
New Zealand  2  1.4  1  1  50.0 
Norway 6  4.3  3  3  50.0 
Portugal 9  6.4  2  7  22.2 
Spain 5  3.5 3  2  60.0 
Sweden 3  2.1  2  1  66.7 
Turkey 3  2.1  2  1  66.7 
United Kingdom  24  17.0  16  8  66.7   36
Table V. (Adjusted) Value of Privatized and Matching Firms 
Data relating to 141 privatized corporations and 141 matching firms are used to construct this table. The table presents 
the mean and (below) the median of Market-to-Book. In each year, the top and bottom 2% observations are excluded. 
a, 
b, and 
c denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.  
Year 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Panel A: Whole Sample (Market-to-Book) 
Privatized firms (A)  1.72  1.92  2.39  2.62  2.21 
  1.49 1.68  2.00  1.98  2.07 
Matching firms (B)  2.96  3.31  3.51  3.91  2.82 
  2.37 2.61  2.50  2.45  2.23 
No. matched pairs  104  106  93  82  68 
















 a -0.16 
c 
Wilcoxon Z-stat  5.88   5.40   3.39   2.58   1.78  
Panel B: Gov’t Controlled (as of end ‘96) vs. their Peers  
Gov’t Controlled (C)  1.73  1.97  2.16  2.39  2.00 
  1.59 1.80  1.91  1.60  2.17 
Matching firms (D)  2.28  2.49  2.80  2.98  2.48 
  1.94 2.10  2.22  1.96  1.72 
No. matched pairs  33  35  33  27  24 
Difference Means (C) – (D)  -0.55
 a -0.52
 c -0.63  -0.59  -0.48 
T-stat  -2.86 -1.99  -1.56  -0.90  -1.19 
Difference Medians (C) – (D)  -0.35 
a -0.30  -0.31  -0.36  0.45 
Wilcoxon Z-stat  2.28   1.20  1.55  0.86  1.03 
Panel C: Non-Gov’t Controlled (as of end ‘96) vs. their Peers  
Non-Gov’t Controlled (E)  1.72  1.90  2.52  2.73  2.32 
  1.43 1.66  2.00  2.10  2.00 
Matching firms (F)  3.22  3.71  3.91  4.36  3.00 
  2.37 2.92  2.64  3.05  2.31 
No. matched pairs  71  71  60  55  44 




 a -0.68 
T-stat  -4.95 -4.64  -2.76  -2.86  -1.36 
Difference Medians (E) – (F)  -0.94




Wilcoxon Z-stat  5.31   5.37   2.95   2.55   1.33 
          
  
   37
Table VI. Estimating the (Adjusted) Value of Privatized Companies 
This table reports the estimated coefficients and associated t-statistics (in parentheses) of random effects panel data 
estimation under the assumption that intercepts are drawn from a normal distribution. All the variables are constructed 
as differences between the values of the privatized and matching firm in year t. The dependent variable is the market-to-
book (DMB). DDEBT is the ratio debt-to-ratio equity. DCAPEX is total capital expenditure to sales. DASSETURN is 
asset turnover, measured by the ratio of sales to total assets. DSIZE is the (log of) end of year market capitalization. 
STATE is the government’s voting rights in the privatized firm. SPECIAL is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the 
Government enjoys special powers in privatized companies. Special powers stem from the possession of special class 
shares and from provisions contained in the privatized company’s statute, which include (i) the right to appoint 
members to corporate boards; (ii) the right to consent to or to veto the acquisition of relevant interests in the privatized 
company; (iii) other rights such as to consent to the transfer of subsidiaries, dissolution of the company, or even 
ordinary management decisions. PETROLEUM, TRANSPORT, UTILITIES are sector dummies built based on two-
digits SIC codes (see Table IV). YEAR DUMMIES is a set of time dummies for 1996-2000 (coefficients are not 
reported). The Wald χ
2 tests the null that all coefficients are jointly equal to zero. The Hausman χ
2 tests the null of non-
systematic differences in the coefficients of the fixed and random effects model. 
a, 
b, and 
c denote statistical significance 
at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.  
Dependent variable  DMB
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
DDEBT -0.375  -0.388  -0.591
b  -0.381 -0.604
b 
 (-1.27)  (-1.32)  (-2.25)  (-1.29)  (-2.30) 
DCAPEX -0.014  -0.014
c -0.003 -0.014
c  -0.004 














 (6.11)  (6.17)  (6.28)  (6.13)  (6.32) 
STATE   1.902  3.044
b  2.075 3.100
b 
   (1.36)  (2.18)  (1.47)  (2.21) 
SPECIAL     0.726    -0.207 
     (0.76)    (-0.19) 
PETROLEUM       0.327  0.703 
       (0.23)  (0.45) 
TRANSPORTATION       -1.145  -2.314
c 
       (-0.91)  (-1.61) 
UTILITIES       0.548  1.032 
       (0.57)  (0.87) 
YEAR DUMMIES  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. Obs.  355  355  275  355  275 
R-sq: within  0.183  0.185  0.281  0.184  0.281 
Wald χ
2  65.01 66.86 92.54 68.34 97.50 
Prob. 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Hausman χ
2  6.53 8.75 3.96  11.74  2.63 
Prob. 0.588  0.461  0.914  0.228  0.977   38
Table VII. Estimating the (Adjusted) Value of Privatized Companies with Endogenous Control Rights 
This table reports the estimated coefficients and associated t-statistics (in parentheses) of a 2SLS (two-stage least squares) random 
effects panel data estimation under the assumption that intercepts are drawn from a normal distribution. All the variables are 
constructed as differences between the values of the privatized and the matching firm in year t. The dependent variable is the market-
to-book (DMB). In DDEBT is the debt-to-equity ratio. DCAPEX is total capital expenditure to sales. DASSETURN is asset turnover 
measured by the ratio of sale to total assets. DSIZE is the (log of) end of year market capitalization. STATE is the government’s 
voting rights in the privatized firm. SPECIAL is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Government enjoys special powers in 
privatized companies. Special powers stem from the possession of special class shares and from provisions contained in the 
privatized company’s statute and include (i) the right to appoint members in corporate board; (ii) the right to consent to or to veto the 
acquisition of relevant interests in the privatized company; (iii) other rights such as to consent to the transfer of subsidiaries, 
dissolution of the company, or even ordinary management decisions. PETROLEUM, TRANSPORT, UTILITIES are sector dummies 
built based on two-digits SIC codes (see Table IV). YEAR DUMMIES is a set of time dummies for 1996-2000 (coefficients are not 
reported). In second stage estimations, STATE is replaced by the fitted value from first-stage regressions, where the debt-to-GDP 
ratio, the right-left orientation of the incumbent government (PARTISAN), the presence of a majoritarian-consensual pattern of 
democracy in the country (POLINST) are used as instrumental variables. The Wald χ
2 tests the null that all coefficients are jointly 
equal to zero. The Sargan χ
2 tests over identifying restrictions.. 
a, 
b, and 
c denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, 
respectively.   
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent  variables  STATE DMB STATE DMB STATE DMB STATE DMB 
DDEBT  -0.033 -0.080 0.002 0.795 -0.036 -0.083 0.001 -0.868 
 (-1.11)  (-0.11)  (0.08)  (-1.04)  (-1.20) (-0.12) (0.05) (-1.15) 
DCAPEX -0.0001  -0.013
c  -0.00006 -0.003 -0.0001 -0.014
c  -0.00004 -0.004 
  (-0.43) (-1.71) (-0.17) (-0.43) (-0.42) (-1.80) (-0.10) (-0.51) 
DASSETURN -0.029  1.592
a  -0.016 3.12
a  -0.037
c  1.397
a  -0.018 3.089
a 
 (-1.35)  (3.10)  (-0.53) (4.78) (-1.68) (2.62) (-0.60) (4.73) 
DSIZE 0.029  3.619
a  0.049
c  3.59











   (1.95)  (2.16)  (2.07)  (2.00) 
SPECIAL     0.067  0.320    0.054  -0.766 
     (1.58)  (0.33)    (1.11)  (-0.70) 
POLINST -0.105
a   -0.111
a   -0.107
a   -0.117
a   
  (-7.13)  (-5.75)  (-7.13)  (-6.03)  
PARTISAN -0.016
b   -0.019
b   -0.017
b   -0.020
a   
  (-2.20)  (-2.29)  (-2.34)  (-2.39)  
DEBT/  GDP  -0.095  -0.092  -0.100  -0.108  
  (-1.39)  (-1.10)  (-1.45)  (-1.29)  
PETROLEUM       -0.001  0.671  0.031  0.826 
       (-0.03)  (0.55)  (0.46)  (0.58) 
TRANSPORTATION       0.134
a  -1.606 0.162
a  -2.494
b 
       (2.74)  (-1.37)  (2.57)  (-1.82) 
UTILITIES       0.024  0.850  0.055  0.866 
       (0.65)  (1.00)  (1.03)  (0.76) 
YEAR  DUMMIES  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No.  Obs.  298 298 228 228 298 298 228 228 
Wald 
  84.00 76.07 78.00 85.00 94.00 78.66 87.00 90.58 
Prob.  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan χ
2   1.431  0.342  1.431  0.342 
Prob.   0.489  0.843  0.489  0.843   39
Table VIII. Robustness Tests: Estimates Using an Alternative Benchmark 
This table reports the estimated coefficients and associated t-statistics (in parentheses) of a 2SLS (two-stage least squares) random 
effects panel data estimation under the assumption that intercepts are drawn from a normal distribution. All the variables are 
constructed as differences between the values of the privatized firm and its two-digit SIC industry/country median in year t. The 
dependent variable is the market-to-book (DMB). All independent variables are described in Table VII.  
a, 
b, and 
c denote statistical 
significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent  variables  STATE DMB  STATE  DMB STATE DMB  STATE  DMB 
DDEBT 0.072
c  -0.240 0.069 0.128  0.076
c  -0.270 0.071  0.145 
 (1.64)  (-0.68)  (1.25)  (0.30)  (1.71) (-0.75)  (1.29)  (0.34) 
DCAPEX  0.0001  -0.005  0.0002  -0.006 -2.1e-06 -0.004 0.00009  -0.005 
 (0.27)  (-1.30)  (0.40)  (-1.36)  (-0.00) (-0.95) (0.16)  (-1.16) 
DASSETURN 0.003  0.142  -0.004  0.016  0.002  0.177  -0.005  0.032 










 (2.81)  (7.83)  (2.84)  (6.58)  (2.91) (7.44) (2.74)  (6.54) 
STATE 
  2.382
b   2.689
b   2.514
b   2.670
b 
   (2.38)    (2.44)    (2.40)    (2.44) 
SPECIAL     -0.054  -0.012      -0.014  -0.121 
     (-1.49) (-0.04)      (-0.31)  (-0.35) 
POLINST -0.111
a   -0.114
a   -0.107
a   -0.115
a   
  (-7.72)   (-6.39)   (-7.36)   (-6.41)   
PARTISAN -0.012
c   -0.016
b   -0.012
c   -0.016
b   
  (-1.91)   (-1.97)   (-1.87)   (-1.94)   
DEBT/ GDP  -0.099    -0.069   -0.082    -0.057  
  (-1.60)   (-0.93)   (-1.30)   (-0.76)   
PETROLEUM         -0.063  0.532  -0.053  0.141 
         (-1.15)  (1.16)  (-0.85)  (0.28) 
TRANSPORTATION         0.071  -0.090  0.105
b  -0.508 
         (1.58)  (-0.24)  (2.01)  (-1.19) 
UTILITIES         -0.025  -0.063  -0.019  -0.094 
         (-0.72)  (-0.22)  (-0.40)  (-0.26) 
YEAR  DUMMIES  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. Obs.  362  362  273  273  362  362  273  273 
Wald 
  80.00 95.45  79.00  73.05 86.00 74.83  86.00  73.46 
Prob. 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
Sargan χ
2   0.552    1.123  0.552   1.123 
Prob.   0.759    0.570    0.759    0.570 
   40
Table IX. Robustness Tests: Agency Costs and IPO Dates 
 
This table reports the estimated coefficients and associated t-statistics (in parentheses) of a 2SLS (two-stage least squares) cross 
section estimation for year 1996 and 2000. All the variables are constructed as differences between the values of the privatized and 
the matching firm in year t. The dependent variable is the market-to-book (DMB). In DDEBT is the debt-to-equity ratio. DCAPEX is 
total capital expenditure to sales. DASSETURN is asset turnover measured by the ratio of sale to total assets. DSIZE is the (log of) 
end of year market capitalization. STATE is the government’s voting rights in the privatized firm. DCONC represents the voting 
rights of the largest shareholder. D(CONC
2) is the squared term for the voting rights of the largest shareholder. DIPODATE is the 
number of years lapsing from the IPO. IV are the same as in Table VII. F-stat tests the null the all coefficients are jointly zero. The 
Sargan χ
2 tests over identifying restrictions. 
a, 
b, and 
c denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable   DMB 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 1996  2000  1996  2000 
DDEBT  -0.482 -2.129 -1.016 -1.934 
  (-0.28) (-1.50) (-0.43) (-1.31) 
DCAPEX 0.012  -0.080
b  -0.002 -0.079
c 
  (0.73) (-1.98) (-0.14) (-1.86) 
DASSETURN 1.881
b  1.469 1.208 0.720 
  (2.22) (1.08) (1.32) (0.56) 




  (0.94) (2.67) (1.91) (2.93) 
STATE 7.848
c  -1.658 6.931
b  3.989 
 (1.77)  (-0.14)  (1.99)  (0.67) 
DCONC -0.025  0.011     
 (-1.04)  (0.21)     
D(CONC
2)
  0.0002 -0.001     
 (0.37)  (-0.63)     
DIPODATE     -0.010  -0.023 
     (-0.53)  (-1.16) 
No. Obs.  73  50  62  47 
F-stat  1.96 3.03 1.88 3.22 
Prob.  0.074 0.011 0.101 0.011 
Sargan  1.615 2.120 0.669 0.780 
Prob.  0.446 0.346 0.715 0.677 
 
  